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Introduction: the nature of pluralism 
 
 Pluralism as a vision of professional interaction in research and pedagogy has 
acquired a growing following in economics, first and foremost among heterodox economists 
but also now also among mainstream economists associated with the new research 
approaches in the field.  At the same time, debate and discussion about the nature of 
pluralism in economics still seems to be at an early stage with many important questions still 
unaddressed.  One major issue concerns the relationship between pluralism seen as a 
prescription for economic practice and pluralism seen as a description of economic practice.  
Consider the following two questions.  Do calls for pluralism reflect there already being real 
movement toward pluralism in the discipline?  Or, do calls for pluralism help create a basis for 
pluralism in the discipline?  Though many might reject the either/or nature of these questions, 
and wish to affirm both, the relative weight they place on each proposition makes a difference 
to how we understand pluralism.  That is, if there is a real movement toward pluralism in 
economics, this would tell us specific things about how pluralism can be supported.  
Alternatively, if calls for pluralism are primarily instrumental in creating the basis on which 
pluralism may develop in the discipline, this tells us something else about how pluralism can 
be supported. 
 
 Freeman and Kliman (2006) appear to take the latter view of the matter, namely, they 
see prescription in the lead, see very little actual pluralism in economics (including in 
heterodox economics), and hope that a clear and commanding call for pluralism will create a 
particular kind of pluralism they label ‘critical pluralism.’  My view is somewhat the opposite of 
theirs, and is at once both optimistic and pessimistic.  I am optimistic in believing that there is 
an increasing practice of pluralism in economics (in both heterodox and, contrary to what 
many hold, also in mainstream economics), and that this practice is influencing the culture of 
economics.  I am pessimistic in believing that the limitations that apply to the current practice 
of pluralism in economics narrow what may realistically be sought in attempts to create a 
stronger culture of pluralism in economics.   
 
 In this paper I seek to contrast these two visions of pluralism in economics, and 
emphasize the central importance of strategy regarding pluralism in economics.  Strategy on 
this subject depends in my view on sorting out the relationship between pluralism’s status as 
a prescription for economic practice and its use as a description of economic practice.  My 
general view, however, irrespective of how people sort out their different understandings of 
this relationship, is that there has been very little thinking thus far about pluralism as a 
‘strategic pluralism,’ where this involves determining what goals to pursue relative to the 
context in which they are pursued (see Davis and Sent, 2006).   
 
 This short paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 of the paper sets out Freeman 
and Kliman’s critical pluralist conception of pluralism.  Section 3 examines the assumptions 
behind critical pluralism, and argues that their view of natural science, on which it rests, is 
inaccurate.  Section 4 examines the strategy for reform of economics that Freeman and 
Kliman employ, and argues that this strategy is unlikely to be effective.  Section 5 turns to an 
alternative view of pluralist reform for economics, drawing on the interconnectedness of 
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values and explanations, and characterizes this view as a strategic pluralism.  Section 6 





 In their recent contribution to the Post-Autistics Economic Review, Alan Freeman and 
Andrew Kliman (2006) argue that economics is not a pluralistic science, and make a strong 
case that it ought to be if it is to be a genuine science.  Their interpretation of pluralism as 
critical pluralism identifies a set of obligations they believe all researchers should always 
observe.  Briefly, researchers should critically engage alternative explanations, including their 
presuppositions, identity the evidence for their own explanations, and identify the evidence for 
alternative explanations.  In a word, critical pluralism is about engagement.  Most economists, 
they argue, pursue their research without consideration of the research and arguments of 
others.  Freeman and Kliman believe, however, that genuinely scientific research is always 
carried out in the spirit of serious attention to alternative research pathways. 
 
 Behind their proposal lies a critique of a strategy for pluralism they attribute to 
heterodoxy: “we argue that heterodox economists have made the mistake of reducing 
pluralism to diversity,” where what they mean by this is advocating that there be a multitude of 
diverse approaches in economics.  The problem with this strategy, they believe, is that it 
results in a set of “monotheoretic” practices largely closed off to one another in a supposed 
evolutionary “market for economic theory” (31).  Proponents of each approach expect their 
particular approach will ultimately be seen to be true, and accordingly feel little need to 
engage other approaches.  The International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in 
Economics (ICAPE) is taken to be an embodiment of this conception of pluralism in that 
ICAPE is seen as an umbrella organization for heterodox groups that share an antipathy to 
neoclassicism but otherwise communicate very little with one another.  Accordingly, when it 
comes to heterodoxy’s stance toward orthodoxy, this kind of pluralism is then confined to 
insisting that every ‘school,’ orthodox or heterodox, be fairly represented within economics as 
a legitimate school – that is, that economics be re-made in the image of ICAPE.  In their view, 
however, this understanding of pluralism reproduces both between schools and indeed within 
schools the same intolerance that orthodoxy exhibits vis-à-vis heterodoxy, and thus it can 
never contribute to the reform of economics as a whole.  As an understanding of pluralism, 
they argue, it goes wrong in failing to appreciate the multiplicity of views within any particular 
school, the opportunities for real exchange between researchers who disagree, and is 
contrary to the spirit of engagement they believe characterizes genuine science. 
 
 Freeman and Kliman’s answer, then, to the question, why is economics not yet a 
pluralistic science, is simply that economics is not yet a science.  “Our central thesis is that 
pluralism is not the condiment but the main course.  Because economics is not pluralist, it is 
not scientific” (38; original emphasis).  Their answer thus resonates with Thorstein Veblen’s 
and Alfred Eichner’s almost identical answers to similar questions.  Veblen asked why 
economics was not an evolutionary science (Veblen, 1898), and Eichner asked why 
economics was not yet a science (Eichner, 1983).  They both faulted neoclassical economics, 
because they believed neoclassical economics to be fundamentally nonscientific.  For both, 
neoclassicism constitutes a metaphysical system not grounded in empirical practices and a 
culture of open exchange between scientists that permit the development of ideas and 
theories.  Thus like Freeman and Kliman, they regard the main problem as a bad science 
culture of economics.   
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 Where Veblen and Eichner, on the one hand, and Freeman and Kliman, on the other, 
seem to disagree, however, is with respect to the confidence we can place on evolutionary 
forces to create an open science culture in economics.  Veblen and Eichner arguably see 
good epistemological and empirical practice as a positive selection device in economics and 
social science, whereas Freeman and Kliman argue that “the evolution of ideas in economics 
selects not for truth, but for political acceptance, above all by those classes in society who 
fund it” (Freeman and Kliman, 2006, 39).  Neoclassicism, then, is selected for on Freeman 
and Kliman’s argument on the grounds of its political acceptability.  Alternatively, pluralism in 
economics is not produced by evolutionary forces.  At the same time, the opposite is said to 
be the case with respect to natural science: 
 
The selection process in the natural sciences is, possibly against the will of the 
natural scientists, intrinsically pluralistic.  What we mean by this is that the sciences 
are organised in such a way that, in the course of their quest to explain natural 
phenomena, observed reality is tested against a wide range of possible theoretical 
explanations of that reality (Ibid., 42; original emphasis). 
 
 In economics, where this does not apply, the ability of a theory to predict is 
consequently not regarded as an important criterion of acceptance or rejection, with the result 
that ‘logical coherence’ – too often something merely in the eyes of the beholder – is 
advanced in the place of empirical adequacy.   
 
 Freeman and Kliman’s view of pluralism as critical pluralism is thus a reflection of 
their understanding of natural science’s scientific culture, and their main recommendation is 
that economics adopt this culture.  They set out this model in terms of seven norms and rules 
for pluralistic scholarly engagement generated by the International Working Group on Value 
Theory (IWGVT), and apply it to recent debates over Marx’s value theory.  As they 
emphasize, the  
 
first function of debate is not to settle differences, but, by means of engagement to 
understand what each alternative is trying to say in its own right, to draw out the 
implications, and thus see where the differences lie without any prior judgement on 
which theory or interpretation is necessarily true.  At this point, when the differences 
are clear, criteria for deciding between the alternatives can be applied (Ibid., 49-50; 
original emphasis). 
 
 The key criterion, they then add, is empirical success: “The criterion of success for a 
natural science is empirical.  It is that of prediction” (41). 
 
 
A closer look at natural science 
 
 There are a number of debatable assumptions underlying Freeman and Kliman’s 
implicit understanding of natural science that deserve examination, but I will only list four of 
them here which seems particularly contentious: 
 
(i)  natural science is generally pursued in a spirit of open engagement 
(ii) natural science relies on empirical success to determine acceptable theory 
(iii)  value judgments and ideology do not limit natural science development 
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(iv)  critical engagement precedes identifying criteria for judging alternatives 
 
 I don’t want to suggest that natural science does not have any advantages over social 
science in these four respects, but rather that the differences between natural science and 
social science are not as great as Freeman and Kliman imply.  This, at the very least, is the 
message of Thomas Kuhn and much of the subsequent constructivist history of science 
studies literature (e.g., Barnes, Bloor, and Henry, 1996; Golinksi, 1998).  Let me identify what 
I regard to be two important conclusions of this literature which are at odds with these 
assumptions.  First, empirical testing is often not a determinant of which theories are 
accepted, and the role it plays in natural science is often framed by the very theories it is 
meant to test.  Second, natural science practice is also quite strongly associated with 
‘schools’ which reflect both the tendency of certain institutions and research locations to favor 
certain theories and approaches, as well as rely on a variety of ‘deep’ assumptions scientists 
hold about reality. 
 
 We might ask, then, what motivates the particular view Freeman and Kliman have of 
the difference between natural science and social science.  It is not, they tell us, that natural 
scientists are better scientists: “Left to their own devices, it is perfectly possible that natural 
scientists would conduct themselves little differently from the economists” (41).  Rather, they 
believe that natural science has a different social function in a capitalist economy: 
 
a capitalist economy, in which successful competition of capitals demands the 
successful implementation of technology, imposes a powerful objective constraint [on 
natural science] ….  Scientific theories are desired by capitalist society because they 
give rise to products and processes, and these are required to work.  This severely 
limits the selection of bad ideas: theories that lead to bridges or buildings falling 
down, or aeroplanes falling from the skies, have a limited shelf life” (Ibid.). 
 
 But how limited a shelf life?  This argument assumes a competitive model of 
capitalism, and rules out monopoly capitalism, path dependency, Microsoft, and a host of 
questionable technological developments that characterize modern economies which 
arguably allow shelf lives of technologies to be relatively protracted despite better 
technologies being possible and often available.  Of course, the view that the competitive 
model applies to capitalism is controversial in economics, including within Marxist economics.  
Further, while it may well often appear that existing technologies seem reliable, we really 
don’t know what the standard for reliability is since it depends on a host of counterfactual 
possibilities.  Had modern production been organized differently, might existing technologies 
have been even better? 
 
 For example, while it is true that buildings usually don’t fall down, we now know that 
their technologies are not particularly advanced from an environmental perspective, though 
knowledge of what is needed to make them so has long been available (and is in many cases 
energy cost-saving as well).  Might capitalist production, then, not actually have exerted the 
pressure on technological development and natural science that Freeman and Kliman 
assume, and thus only enforced a modest engagement on the part of natural scientists 
sufficient?  Might there even be widespread suppression of technologies that are superior but 
which would undermine technologies to which monopoly firms are committed?   
 
 The risk in Freeman and Kliman’s position is that it easily lends itself to simply 
assuming that natural science is superior to social science in regard to openness and 
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engagement.  But the larger issue here concerns what modeling social science on natural 
science implies about how we think about pluralism and strategies for pluralism in economics.  
Returning, then, to the issue of pluralism as a prescription for and a description of current 
economics, what is Freeman and Kliman’s view of the relationship between pluralism as a 
prescription and as a description, and what does this imply about strategies for pluralism? 
 
 
The strategy of critical pluralism 
 
 Recall that Freeman and Kliman see very little actual pluralism in economics – thus 
their view that we need to reach outside of economics to natural science to create a culture of 
pluralism for economics.  This then entails their view of the relationship between pluralism as 
a prescription and as a description, namely, that prescription needs to take the lead to create 
a basis on which pluralism may develop in the discipline.  Specifically, that basis is critical 
pluralism understood as critical engagement between researchers.  Broadly, then, their 
strategy for pluralism is a matter of embedding this ideal in the practices and culture of 
economics.  How might this strategy be pursued? 
 
 On the surface of things, it would seem that they have already made the case that 
there is no way to pursue such a strategy.  Indeed Freeman and Kliman not only say there is 
very little actual pluralism in economics, but also say that economics is incapable of reforming 
itself.  Yet they do see one hope for reforming economics. 
 
We believe economics is … incapable of self-reform.  Our reform programme is 
therefore not primarily addressed to economists but to the consumers of their product 
(32). 
 
In our view … the fault in economics lies in the entire notion that the job of the 
economist is to judge, on behalf of the consumers of economics, what is a correct 
theory.  We sustain that the function of economic research is, on the contrary, to lay 
bare the concealed assumptions behind theories so that the consumers of our output 
may for themselves judge between them (34). 
 
 In effect, then, they substitute for the effect they believe that the competition of 
capitals has on technology development in natural science an effect they believe the various 
consumers of economics could have on the development of economics.   
 
 But why should we expect the consumers of economics to be in any position to 
impose significant pressures on economists?  One important thing about the argument 
concerning technology and the competition between capitals is that it identifies a unified force 
which in principle affects the behavior of all natural scientists in the same way.  New 
technologies, as well as responses to them, need to be genuinely innovative.  Research that 
is ideological should be unaffordable.  But by comparison, the consumers of economics are a 
variety of different interest groups, who accordingly exert a variety of different types of 
pressure on economists.  For example, public policy based on the standard theory of labor 
markets has at least two major constituencies whose respective goals for the functioning of 
labor markets are in many ways opposed.  One constituency may regard the enactment of a 
particular policy as a success which the other regards as a failure (for example, a minimum 
wage law).  Prima facie, then, it is not true that “consumers of our output may for themselves 
judge between them,” but rather that economists have considerable freedom to advance 
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those ideological positions that are best suited to the different interests among consumers 
they wish to serve, exactly as Freeman and Kliman say has historically been the case.  
Indeed why should the future be any different from the past? 
 
 Thus, just as it seems unrealistic to reach outside of economics to natural science to 
introduce pluralist ideals, so it seems unrealistic to reach outside of economics to the 
consumers of economics to apply a pressure for pluralism in economics.  I suggest, then, that 
the problem with treating pluralism primarily as a prescription meant to lay basis for pluralism 
in practice is that the perceived absence of a basis for pluralism in economics gives these 
external points of influence no detectable leverage on economics.  Essentially what Freeman 
and Kliman consequently offer is an abstract ethical idea, despite their denial that this is the 
upshot of their position. 
 
It may be thought that such a programme is normative and ethical, rather than 
positive or scientific.  We will argue that, on the contrary, without formal guarantees of 
pluralism and critical method, economics does not function as a science.  Our guiding 
principle is to identify those practices which society must impose on its economists, 
should it require these economists to provide them scientifically valid information (32). 
 
 But the logic here seems circular.  Economics, they seem to be saying, will not 
become a science until it becomes a science, and this can only occur by having pluralist 
practices imposed upon it.  Thus Freeman and Kliman’s strategy, it appears, is only normative 
and ethical.  Given, then, the unlikelihood that consumers of economics can impose this ideal 
on economics, the implication seems to be that a strategy of pluralism needs to be normative 
and ethical while also being based on real movement toward pluralism already in economics.  
That basis may be admittedly inadequate in important respects.  Freeman and Kliman are 
certainly perceptive in their judgment of a pluralism of diversity and schools as tending to 
incorporate the same intolerances orthodoxy exhibits toward heterodoxy.  They are also 
surely correct in emphasizing the need to set high standards for pluralism, and who would 
dispute the integrity of their vision of pluralism as critical engagement?  My complaint, rather, 
is one that concerns the best strategy for pluralism, and accordingly in the following section I 





 Strategic pluralism begins with the idea that calls for pluralism must target existing 
commitments to pluralism in economics.  From a social economic perspective, values and 
explanations are indissolubly linked, and thus prescriptions and descriptions are always tied 
to one another.  The strategic part of this idea lies in working out the specific connections 
between them, and doing so in a way that preserves both.  Thus, if a certain descriptive basis 
for pluralistic practice exists in economics, prescriptive calls for pluralism begin on that basis, 
but must also go beyond it – otherwise they offer nothing normative.  The business of how 
one goes beyond current practice, or how particular standards for pluralism may be effective 
in influencing current practice, is of course subject to different opinions about the best 
strategy possible.  I will offer one view of such a strategy, and then apply it to the current 
situation in economics.   
 
 First, however, to demonstrate the kinds of constraints that current pluralist practice, 
such as it is, imposes on prescriptions for pluralism, let me set out a type of strategy which is 
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arguably not effective as a means of developing pluralist practice in economics, even though 
it still involves what I consider a strategic pluralism.  This might be termed a strategy of 
demonstrating contradictions between current practices and the pluralist ideals associated 
with those same practices as operate in particular schools or approaches in economics.  The 
strategy might proceed as follows: identify a current pluralist practice in economics within a 
school or approach; describe inconsistencies in this practice vis-à-vis other schools or 
approaches; then argue in the name of pluralism that these inconsistencies should be 
eliminated, thus extending pluralist practice and further enhancing the ideal of pluralism in 
that school or approach (as well in economics as a whole).  For example, consider recent 
behavioral economics and its critiques of neoclassical rational choice theory.  As the 
economics profession has long resisted critiques of the theory of choice, behavioral 
economists have argued that the field should be more open and embrace a variety of 
approaches to explaining choice (e.g., Starmer, 2000).  At the same time, however, many 
feminist economists would likely say that behavioral economics still largely ignores the role of 
gender in choice.  This might accordingly be registered as an inconsistency, and then 
presented to behavioral economists for them to address, accompanied by a call for a more 
pluralistic behavioral economics, on the grounds that such a development is consistent with 
behavioral economics’ existing basis for pluralism.   
 
 The problem with this strategy in my view is due to the constraints imposed by 
economics’ pluralist division into schools or approaches.  The feminist critique arises outside 
of the behavioralist school, and operates by showing an inconsistency across schools.  But on 
the argument Freeman and Kliman advance regarding the nature of current economics with 
its associated intolerance between schools, this critique is likely to be dismissed out of hand 
by behavioral economists, despite its being a valid critique from their own perspective, and 
despite its being an extension of their pluralist critique of neoclassical intolerance, solely for 
the reason that it originates in another school.   
 
 Though Freeman and Kliman do not consider the existence of competing schools in 
economics a basis for pluralism, it seems to be more accurate to say that the existence of 
competing schools in economics creates a particular kind of pluralism, since the existence of 
competing schools produces a form of heterogeneity different and indeed stronger than is 
involved in there being distinct orientations within a single paradigm.  It is this specific kind of 
pluralism which gives rise to the diversity ideal, which though obviously modest by their 
standard of critical pluralism nonetheless involves one kind of pluralist ideal.  The point that 
follows from this, then, is that the modest basis which a ‘diversity pluralism’ offers has two 
sides to it.  It bars certain kinds of attempts to extend pluralism, particularly those that directly 
challenge the autonomy of schools, but it also creates specific opportunities for extending 
pluralism. 
  
 The kind of strategic pluralism I recommend, then, aims to operate within the 
constraint of diversity pluralism but also aims to create possibilities for a broader form of 
pluralism.  Specifically, rather than demonstrating contradictions across schools as an 
argument for extending pluralism, it seeks to demonstrate shared principles across schools to 
reduce intolerance between them, and thereby generate greater support for pluralism in 
general.  On Freeman and Kliman’s view, schools are “monotheoretic” in their exclusive 
commitment to their own programs, and the defense of diversity is really just a form of self-
defense.  But this self-defense can come to be perceived as encompassing the goals of other 
schools if a school’s own principles are seen as shared with other schools.  Indeed this 
argument has been advanced quite explicitly in ICAPE and for heterodoxy in general 
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(Lawson, 2006; Lee, 2006) and separately also for the new approaches in economics (Gintis, 
2007).  I have argued that it can and ought to be advanced with respect to principles shared 
by heterodoxy and the new approaches in economics (Davis, 2006).  Let me give one 
example of this argument about shared principles to illustrate. 
 
 Behavioral economics rejects the neoclassical atomistic individual conception on the 
grounds that preferences are believed to be endogenously constructed rather than 
exogenously given (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2003).  Preferences are framed, anchored, 
elicited, and malleable, depending on the context in which individuals find themselves when 
they make choices.  Individuals are accordingly ‘socially embedded’ in the sense that their 
choices depend on the social contexts in which they make them.  This conception, however, 
is very much like the one which operates in many heterodox approaches that argue 
individuals are social in nature.  This is not to say that differences do not exist between the 
understanding behavioral economics has of individuals’ social embeddedness and the 
general heterodox understanding of it.  The behavioral conception treats the concept of 
‘social’ far more abstractly and ahistorically than does the heterodox conception.  But both 
nonetheless reject the neoclassical atomistic individual conception, and this arguably allows 
bridges to be built between the behavioral and heterodox conceptions.   
 
 How, then, ought one to proceed in advancing pluralism by targeting this shared 
principle?  One thing possible is that heterodox economists who are motivated to show that 
the context of choice incorporates a larger sense of the ‘social’ than many behavioral 
economists employ ought to produce explanations of contextualized choice that are 
institutionally rich, and do so by showing how the behavioralist language of preferences – 
their being framed, anchored, elicited, and malleable depending on their context – reflects 
concrete institutional settings.  In fact, there is precedent for this wider social-institutional 
embedding in research already being carried out by behavioral economists, for example on 
individual choices in pension systems (e.g., Mitchell and Utkus, 2004), and indeed one 
member associate of ICAPE, the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics 
(SABE), is active in research emphasizing the wider social-institutional dimensions of 
contextualized choice.   
 
 My argument, then, is that this kind of strategy for advancing pluralism – one kind of 
strategic pluralism – not only operates within the constraints of an existing diversity pluralism 
in economics, but also offers the promise of extending pluralist practices in economics by 
developing links between different schools.  It thus builds prescription around description 
rather than pose norms and standards that have little or no existing basis in the field, and 
accordingly constitutes what seems a more realistic approach to the problem of pluralism in 
economics.  In the remaining section of this paper, I turn to what pursuing this kind of 
strategic pluralism might mean to economics in the long run. 
 
 
Pluralism in the long run 
 
 It is always tempting to see the future as a reflection of the past, and so many are no 
doubt inclined to see the prospects for pluralism in economics as not very promising.  The 
long dominance of economics by neoclassicism gives good grounds for this view, and the 
vulnerable and marginalized position of heterodox economics – where pluralism is explicitly 
defended – reinforces it.  One might, however, argue that it is becoming increasingly difficult 
for economics to be dominated by single approaches, and that there will be a steady 
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continuing emergence of new approaches in the field in the future.  Basically, so this 
argument would go, the object of economics, the economy, is only becoming increasingly 
complex with a growing multitude of dimensions and aspects, so that not only are new 
approaches to explaining different previously unrecognized aspects of the economy 
continually arising, but no single approach seems any longer to be sufficiently comprehensive 
to explain the economy in its diverse dimensions and aspects.  Compounding this is the 
apparent increase in interdisciplinarity across all the sciences.  Increased cross-boundary 
borrowing together with conceptual exports and imports between sciences seems to be the 
product of an expansion of science in general in the last half century.  But such transfers 
inject materials into sciences that usually do not immediately conform with what is already 
there, thus further multiplying the heterogeneous character of the sciences.   
 
 If these patterns of development characterize the future, then economics would 
regularly see the emergence of new approaches, many laying the foundations for new 
schools.  Though dominant approaches may still arise, their tenure might be briefer, and their 
hold on economics as a whole more fragile.  What this would then mean in the framework of 
the discussion here is that diversity pluralism or the pluralism of schools would regularly 
receive new impetus.  Rather than ICAPE being an exceptional development, it might indeed 
become a general model within economics.  This would not necessarily guarantee, however, 
an increasing tolerance within economics, since as Freeman and Kliman recognize, the 
existence of schools can be more about boundaries than open exchange.  At the same time, 
a diversity pluralism allows for the possibility of a strategic pluralism that can establish 
tolerance as a general value in economics, perhaps not by the standard of critical 
engagement, but something not to be dismissed either.  
 
 The distinction between tolerance and critical engagement recalls another important 
distinction worth noting when we think about things we hope to achieve.  Comparing different 
kinds of societies we may distinguish between those societies who institutions do not 
humiliate individuals – what may be termed decent societies – and societies whose 
individuals do not humiliate other individuals – what may be termed civilized societies 
(Margalit, 1996).  With respect to pluralism, decent societies might be said to exhibit tolerance 
and offer a kind of diversity pluralism, whereas civilized societies might be said to exhibit the 
higher standard of critical pluralism.  Needless to say, the conditions required to achieve the 
latter are more demanding.  We all, moreover, presumably hope to live in a world of the latter, 
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